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Abstract We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant's activity. The
reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine
the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that
would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation,
such as patent infringement and antidumping.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the economics and the competition policy implications of
injunctive settlements-settlements that implement the terms of an injunction
sought by the plaintiff. The best known examples of such settlements are observed

An earlier version of this material appeared under the title "The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse
Settlements". After that earlier working paper grew to roughly 50 pages, we separated the material
examining reverse settlements generally (e.g., in the torts setting) from the material examining
competition policy implications. This paper focuses on competition policy implications.
K. N. Hylton (E)
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: knhylton@bu.edu
S. Cho
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago, IL, USA
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in the context of competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and
antidumping litigation.
In the patent-antitrust context, a great deal of controversy surrounds "reverse
settlements" (more precisely, reverse payment settlements) in patent infringement
litigation. The reverse settlement involves a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit
(for example, a pharmaceutical company with a patent on a drug) paying the
defendant (for example, a manufacturer of a generic drug) to settle the case. The
reverse settlement typically includes an agreement that the defendant will restrict
sales of the allegedly infringing drug. At present, federal circuit courts are split on
the legality, under the antitrust laws, of reverse settlements in patent litigation.'
In the antidumping context, a similar type of settlement is observed. These are
administrative proceedings in which the plaintiff is technically the United States
Department of Commerce. However, the Commerce Department's proceeding is
brought on behalf of or at the instigation of domestic firms that claim that a foreign
seller has "dumped" goods at unreasonably low prices in their domestic market.
Some antidumping disputes are resolved when a complaint is withdrawn and the
foreign seller increases its price in the domestic market (Prusa 1992). In other
words, the foreign seller opts for some share of the domestic cartel's profits rather
than continuing to fight the dumping charge. As we will see below, this type of
settlement is indistinguishable in economic terms from the reverse settlement.
This paper draws some practical insights on reverse settlements in competitionblocking litigation. We start with a simple model of injunctive and reverse settlements 2
and summarize its implications for the economics of settlements. The model identifies
general conditions under which injunctive settlements and reverse settlements are likely
to be observed, and shows that in the competition-blocking scenario virtually all
injunctive settlements will be in the form of reverse (payment) settlements. In general,
reverse settlements (in comparison to no settlement) are likely when the stakes
associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs.
We then turn to normative questions, specifically the conditions under which
injunctive and reverse settlements are likely to be harmful to social welfare in the
context of competition-blocking litigation. We also examine the divergence
between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize
socially undesirable injunctive settlements. If reverse settlements were barred, the
potential litigants could switch to predispute waivers. We examine the divergence
between the private and the social incentives to waive in the competition-blocking
context, as well as policies to minimize socially undesirable waivers. One new
policy examined is an optimal penalty that would align private and social incentives
to settle or to enter into a predispute waiver agreement.
Favoring legality: In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing
to impose antitrust liability where generic accepted payment in exchange for agreement to delay entry);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 08-1097 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008) (same), available at
http://www.cafc.usCourts.gov/opinions/08-1097.pdf. Opposing legality: In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding per se antitrust violation in agreement to delay generic
entry); Andrx Pharm., Inc., v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).
2 The model of settlement applied here is from Hylton and Cho (2010).

Springer

Eur J Law Econ (2013) 36:243-269

245

We find that in the antidumping context there is a strong case for banning reverse
settlements. In patent-antitrust, the case for holding reverse settlements per se
unlawful under the antitrust laws is unpersuasive.3 A reverse settlement may signal
a weak claim on the part of the plaintiff, but it may also occur because the stakes
associated with the injunction are high. The stakes may be high because of the
anticompetitive potential of the injunctive settlement, or because the injunction
supports market development and innovation incentives. The mere observation of a
reverse settlement would not permit an observer to know whether the settlement is
socially beneficial or detrimental. The model below details the economic factors that
should be considered in a legal analysis (e.g., rule of reason in antitrust) of reverse
settlements in patent infringement litigation.

2 Background
Injunctive and reverse settlements can be observed in any area of litigation in which
plaintiffs seek to enjoin some activity of the defendant. One common example of
this type of litigation is in the nuisance setting, where the plaintiff may sue for
damages and to enjoin the defendant's nuisance-generating activity. A settlement
could involve the defendant agreeing to discontinue his activity.
Competition-blocking litigation provides the most prominent examples today of
injunctive and reverse settlements. Competition-blocking litigation typically
involves a plaintiff (incumbent firm) with market power against a defendant
(entrant) who intends to undercut the plaintiff in its market. The plaintiff's interest is
to maintain the profit it earns from its monopoly. The defendant's interest is to
maintain the profit it earns from undercutting the price set by the plaintiff.
Let G, represent the gain to the incumbent monopolist from blocking competition
and Ld represent the loss to the entrant when competition is blocked. The interests at
stake in competition-blocking litigation can be described by Fig. 1. The rectangle
denoted G, shows the profit earned by the plaintiff (incumbent monopolist) when he
charges the monopoly price p, rather than the competitive price (given his cost
structure) pc. The social cost (or deadweight loss) from monopolization is shown by
the triangular area W.
The competitive price for the plaintiff p, is equal to its unit cost. The rectangle
denoted Ld represents the profit earned by the defendant entrant when he undercuts
the unit cost of the plaintiff. The minimum price for the defendant is pr, which is
equal to its unit cost.

3 This conclusion is in opposition to that taken by the FTC in federal court litigation and of several
commentators, see Crane (2002), Cotter (2004), Hovenkamp et al. (2003), and Hemphill (2006). In
addition, the European Commission has issued a report on patent practices, including settlements, that
suggests the possibility of legal action against major pharmaceutical companies that have entered into
reverse settlement agreements with generic sellers, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/08/746&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. On February 3d,
2009, US senators Herb Kohl and Chuck Grassley introduced legislation to ban reverse patent settlements
in pharmaceutical patent disputes, see http://kohl.senate.gov/press/09/02/2009203B19.html.

I

Springer

246

Eur J Law Econ (2013) 36:243-269

P

Fig. 1 Diagram of Plaintiffs Gain (Gp), Defendant's Loss (La), and Deadweight Loss (W)

In the antidumping context, a domestic cartel earns the profit shown by Gp when
it excludes foreign competition. If the cartel cannot block foreign competition, the
foreign firms will enter and charge a price slightly below p, and take the market to
themselves, capturing Ld. Since Ld represents the profit available to the foreign
sellers, it also represents the loss imposed on them by a competition-blocking
injunction.
In the patent-antitrust context, the drug patent holder charges p, when it blocks
competition from the generic entrant. If it cannot block the generic's entry, the
patent holder will reduce its price to p,. Still, the generic seller may be able to earn a
profit of as much as Ld by undercutting p'.4

3 Model
3.1 Economics of litigation with injunctive settlements
In this part we examine the incentives driving parties to litigate and to settle when
the lawsuit seeks both damages and an injunction (injunctive litigation). The
standard economic analysis of litigation examines the lawsuit for damages (standard
litigation). Since the economic analysis of settlement is familiar, we will focus on
the model's application to competition-blocking lawsuits.
The litigation process is one in which the plaintiff files a complaint, which is then
either settled or prosecuted to a final judgment. The final judgment enjoins the

4

This is an admittedly simple version of competition between an incumbent and a generic seller. In
many instances the generic entrant sells to price-sensitive consumers while the incumbent sells to brandloyal consumers. As a result, the entry of a generic is sometimes followed with a price increase by the
incumbent seller, see Blair and Cotter (2002).
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defendant's activity. In a competition-blocking lawsuit, the final judgment would
require the defendant to increase its price and cede market share, thus losing its gain
from low-price entry, and perhaps to transfer money as compensation to the
plaintiff.
In the patent infringement setting, the plaintiff prosecutes his own claim against
the low-price defendant. That claim can lead to an injunction against the generic
seller as well as damages for the losses suffered by the plaintiff from infringement.
In the antidumping context, a government agency (the US Department of
Commerce) prosecutes the claim. But the plaintiff (the industry whose interests
are represented by the Department of Commerce) can lay claim to the antidumping
penalty under the "Byrd Amendment" (repealed in 2005).5 The final judgment
typically requires the defendant to increase its price, thus losing its gain from lowprice entry, and to pay an antidumping penalty.
Let Pp = the plaintiff's perception of the probability of winning, J = the payoff
to the plaintiff and C = the cost to the plaintiff. In the patent infringement setting,
the plaintiff's perception of the probability of winning is determined by his
prediction that the court will find that infringement occurred, which is a function of
the patent's validity and the defendant's conduct. In the antidumping context, the
plaintiff's perception of the likelihood of victory is high in comparison to civil
litigation because disputes are tried within an agency that is charged with
representing plaintiffs' interests (Cho 2009).
Complaints are filed when the net reward, PPJP - C,, is positive (Shavell 1982a).
Since the plaintiff's judgment consists of Gp = the gain the plaintiff gets from the
injunction, and D = the damage award, he will file a claim when Pp(GP + D) - C > 0.
Let Pd = the defendant's prediction of the plaintiff's probability of winning
(likelihood of finding a violation), Cd = the litigation cost borne by the defendant,
and Jd = the defendant's assessment of the cost of the judgment. Since the judgment
consists of the loss to the defendant from the injunction and the damage award,
Jd = Ld + D, the defendant's cost of the lawsuit is Pd(Ld + D) + Cd. In the context
of competition-blocking litigation, the cost of the judgment to the defendant consists
of the loss that results from being forced to raise price and cede market share plus the
amount the defendant will have to pay as compensation to the plaintiff.
If the expected net gain to the plaintiff from the lawsuit is less than the
defendant's total cost of litigation, the parties will settle. Settlement therefore occurs
when PPG - PdLd + (PP - Pd)D < Cp + Cd, which is the familiar settlement
condition of the Landes-Posner-Gould model. 6 Since the settlement payment must
exceed the expected net reward to the plaintiff from suing and since the expected net
reward must be positive for the plaintiff to have a credible claim of suing, the
settlement will involve a (positive) payment from the defendant to the plaintiff.

5

On the Byrd Amendment, see "Byrd's Bad Idea is Back, Wall Street Journal, Opinion Section,
Monday, August 11, 2008, at A14. Although repealed in 2005, there have been efforts to reenact the Byrd
Amendment".
6 This follows from Pp(Gp + D) - Cp < Pd(Ld + D) + Cd. This assumes that the probability of an
injunction is the same as the probability of an award of damages. That may not be valid in all cases. To
keep the model simple, we will stick with this assumption. The results are easily changed for the case in
which the probabilities differ.
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However, the economics of settlement in injunctive litigation are not fully
described by the Landes-Posner-Gould model, because that model ignores
settlements that implement the injunction sought by the plaintiff (Hylton and Cho
2010). For example, in the competition-blocking context, a settlement implementing
the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff involves the defendant raising its
price or exiting the market in order to let the plaintiff firm or cartel sell at the
monopoly price.
In the injunctive settlement the defendant accepts the terms of the injunction sought
by the plaintiff. Such a settlement is desirable to the defendant if the total cost of the
settlement to the defendant is less than the total cost of the lawsuit, or, equivalently,
S + Ld < Pd(Ld + D) + Cd, where S is the settlement amount. The settlement is
desirable to the plaintiff if the sum of the transfer and the gain from the injunction
exceed his net payoff from the lawsuit: S + Gp > P,(Gp + D) - C. It follows that
the injunctive settlement will be observed if (1 - Pd)Ld - (1 - Pp)Gp + (Pp - Pd)
D < C + Cd. Unlike the standard settlement, the injunctive settlement may require a
payment from plaintiff to defendant, which is the reverse payment settlement.
Since the reverse settlement is controversial, it is worthwhile to examine
the conditions under which it will be observed. The foregoing implies that the
reverse settlement will be observed when Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd and Gp > PJ(D
Gp) - C. Suppose the defendant's loss from an injunction is large relative to the
damages and litigation cost. Since an injunctive settlement would require the
defendant to bear the loss from the injunction with certainty, while litigation
involves only a risk of the loss, the defendant will demand to be paid in order to
accept the injunctive settlement. Also, as the defendant becomes more optimistic, he
will demand a payment in order to settle. Thus, reverse settlements are more likely
when the plaintiff's likelihood of victory is low or when the stakes (Ld, Gp) are high.
The case of consistent beliefs (Pd = P = P) is important because it reflects the
circumstances in some competition-blocking proceedings (e.g., antidumping). If
transaction costs are low some type of settlement (standard or injunctive) will
always occur under consistent beliefs (Hylton and Cho 2010).
3.2 Competition-blocking litigation
In this part we establish a general result for settlements in competition-blocking
litigation. Recall that the competition-blocking scenario involves a plaintiff/
incumbent and a defendant/entrant. Knowing that the incumbent will file a
competition-blocking complaint, the entrant will enter when and only when the gain
from entry is greater than the expected cost of litigation Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd.
However, recall that an injunctive settlement will be desirable to the defendant only
when S + Ld < Pd(Ld + D) + Cd. It follows that in the competition-blocking
scenario:
Proposition 1 All injunctive settlements of competition-blocking litigation will be
in the form of reverse payment settlements.

The intuition behind this statement is straightforward. Since entry occurs only
when the gain to the entrant exceeds the expected cost of litigation, the entrant will
Springer
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demand a payment in order to accept the terms of the injunctive settlement. In the
remainder, we will apply this result to specific areas of competition-blocking
litigation.

4 Applications of model to competition-blocking litigation
The preceding part focused on the incentives for injunctive settlements and
contrasted those incentives with the analysis of standard settlements. Allowing for
injunctive settlements expands the range of settlement agreements available to the
parties, and explains the observation of reverse settlements.
Our focus here is on specific types of competition-blocking litigation, specifically
antidumping proceedings and patent infringement litigation. While we have
emphasized positive analysis to this point, most of the issues examined below are
normative. We will identify the factors that determine the welfare effects of
injunctive settlements of competition-blocking litigation.
4.1 Antidumping
Before examining the implications of the foregoing for antidumping litigation, we
should set out some details on the antidumping process. Antidumping investigations
and proceedings are conducted by two federal agencies, the International Trade
Administration (part of the United States Department of Commerce) and the
International Trade Commission (Cho 2009). An investigation is carried out in
response to a complaint filed by a group of domestic firms, 7 and seeks to determine
whether the domestic firms have suffered a material injury (Cho 2009). If the ITC's
preliminary injury determination is positive, the ITA issues its own preliminary
determination on the existence of dumping, which is defined as a domestic sale at
less than fair value.8 The two agencies subsequently issue final determinations on
dumping and injury, respectively.
Because the investigation and "prosecution" are carried out by government
agencies, the litigation costs borne by the domestic complainants are relatively
small. Conversely, the litigation costs borne by foreign defendants are relatively
large. Defendants are forced to litigate against a government agency that works on
behalf of domestic complainants, and under procedural rules that are biased in favor
of domestic complainants and burdensome on foreign defendants (Cho 2009). If
there is a finding of remediable dumping, the ITA calculates a damage award that is
equal to the difference between the agency's estimated "home price" for the
imported item (fair value) and the actual price of the item in the import market. This
difference is known as the dumping margin.
Although the agency's only remedy is to impose antidumping duties to the extent
of the dumping margin, the final judgment often has the effect of requiring the
7

The current antidumping statute permits domestic producers to petition relevant government agencies
to investigate alleged dumping practices by foreign producers. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1).
8

19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).
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defendant to increase its price and cede market share, thus losing its gain from lowprice entry. In addition, under the Byrd Amendment (repealed in 2005), the
antidumping penalty is transferred to the complainants.
In terms of the model in this paper, antidumping proceedings can be described as
a setting in which C, is small,9 Cd is large, 10 and P is high. Moreover, P will be the
same for both plaintiff and defendant, since both know that the process is biased in
favor of plaintiffs. We will treat antidumping proceedings as consistent-belief
disputes.
Although the proceeding is undertaken by the government, the plaintiff domestic
cartel has the option of withdrawing its complaint against the foreign seller (or
threatening to file the complaint and then never filing it). Withdrawing a complaint
is equivalent to settling the dispute.' 1 We will therefore treat the antidumping
process as a form of private litigation between the plaintiff domestic cartel and the
foreign seller.
Given that the probability of plaintiff victory is high, injunctive settlements are
likely in antidumping litigation. In addition, injunctive settlements are likely if the
plaintiff cartel's gain is greater than the foreign seller's loss from the injunction
(Ld < G), a condition that is likely to hold. Finally, in the antidumping context
transaction costs will rule out the standard settlement that preserves the status quo.
The plaintiff cartel will be unlikely to accept and unable to enforce an agreement in
which they receive a side payment from the foreign entrant in order to relinquish the
market to the foreign firm. Given this, we explore only the injunctive settlement
here.
In the antidumping context, injunctive settlements are not only likely, but they
will virtually always be observed in the form of reverse payment settlements. To see
this, consider the following application of the model to the antidumping scenario.
Given the threat of an antidumping prosecution, the foreign entrant will enter the
market when Ld - P(D + Ld) - Cd > 0, or when P < Pe - (Ld - Cd)/(Ld + D).
The plaintiff (incumbent domestic cartel) will file a claim when P(GP + D)
C/(GP + D).13 Thus, entry occurs and an antidumping
Cp > 0, or when P > Pf
claim will be filed for Pf < P < Pe. From this it follows that:
Proposition 2 All settlements of antidumping prosecutions will be in the form of
reverse payment (injunctive) settlements.

9

Petitioners can expect the government to absorb most of the litigation costs under the statutory
proceeding, see Calvani and Tritell (1986).

10 An antidumping proceeding imposes enormous costs on the defendants, see Music Centers S.N.C. Di
Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp, 874 F.Supp. 543, 547 (1995). Therefore, an
antidumping petition itself can be a very effective method of non-price predation against small yet
efficient foreign producers. The existence of such non-price predation tends to facilitate an injunctive
settlement between antidumping petitioners and respondents. Cho (2009)

" Taylor (2001) observes that some antidumping cases withdrawn during the period 1990-1997 revealed
the same pattern of changes in price and quantity as observed in collusive agreements.
1 It might seem at first glance that the standard settlement should be ruled out by the assumption of
consistent beliefs (Pd - Pp = P). But even in the consistent-beliefs case a standard settlement may occur

when Ld > Gp.
" The entry constraint exploited in this model is emphasized in Higgins (2002).
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This proposition follows from two points established already. First, recall that
standard settlements will not be observed because of transaction costs. Second, note
that since entry occurs only when P < Pe, Ld - P(D + Ld) + Cd > 0, for all such
P, and the rest follows from Proposition 1.
In addition to the finding that the only type of settlement that will be observed is
the reverse payment settlement, this model also implies such settlements will be
common.
Proposition 3 If the plaintiff/incumbent's gain is greater than the entrant's loss
from the injunction (Ld < G) then all antidumpingprosecutions will settle with a
reverse payment. If the plaintiff/incumbent's gain is less than the entrant's loss from
the injunction (Ld > Ge), then settlements will be observed when and only when
Pe > P >

Cd + Cp
1- L.-O
Ld - Gp

The proof of this claim follows straightforwardly from the general settlement
conditions described in the first part of this paper. First, let S
-S, since we
are dealing with only reverse payment settlements. A settlement will occur
when (1 - P)Ld - Cd <S<(1 - P) Gp + Cp. Equivalently, settlement occurs when
(1 - P)(Ld - Gp) < C + Cd, from which the result follows. This argument
assumes Pf < P < Pe.
Example 1 Consider an example that captures some of the features of antidumping
litigation. Suppose the gain to the plaintiff cartel (alternatively, the potential
domestic cartel profit) is $500 and the loss to the defendant foreign seller is $200.
The cost of litigation is $1 for the plaintiff domestic cartel (because the government,
in effect representing the domestic cartel, bears most of the expenses) and $20 for
the defendant. The probability of plaintiff victory is 90%. The damage award, which
is equal to the dumping margin, is $10. This is not necessarily a compensatory
measure; it may exceed actual losses by the plaintiff. In order to accept an injunctive
settlement, the defendant has to consider whether the cost of such a settlement,
S + $200, is less than the cost of litigation, (.9)($10) + (.9)($200) + $20; which is
true for any settlement S < $9. In order to prefer the injunctive settlement the
plaintiff considers whether the settlement payoff S + $500 is greater than the
litigation payoff (.9)($500) - $1 + (.9)($10); which is true for S > -$42. Given
Proposition 2, a reverse payment injunctive settlement will occur with a payment
from the plaintiff to the defendant that satisfies $0 <5< $42.
The reverse payment settlement in this example requires the plaintiff domestic
cartel to drop its complaint against the foreign seller and the foreign seller to cede
market share to the plaintiff cartel. The settlement might involve the plaintiff
domestic cartel either sharing part of its profits or paying a sum, as long as the
amount is no greater than $42, to the defendant foreign seller. Or the arrangement
may be one in which foreign seller both receives a reverse payment and is permitted
to continue selling in the domestic market at a higher price. Suppose the reverse
payment is $25. This is 5% of the potential cartel profit of $500. One way to carry
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out such a settlement would be to assign 5% of the domestic market to the foreign
seller. 1
4.2 Antidumping continued: welfare implications
In antidumping disputes, the gain to the domestic cartel from ousting the foreign
seller comes out of the potential consumer surplus available to domestic consumers.
The cartel's payoff is not attributable to efficiency gains that result from the
exclusion of the foreign seller. The end result of the injunction, or the injunctive
settlement, is unambiguously inefficient.
The foregoing analysis shows that reverse injunctive settlements are more likely
as the probability of plaintiff victory increases and as the plaintiff's gain from the
injunction increases relative to the defendant's loss. When the reverse settlement
results primarily because the plaintiff's probability of victory is very high (i.e., close
to one, subject to the constraint that entry is profitable) it reflects the parties' desire
to avoid litigation costs. Injunctive settlement in this case reflects the outcome likely
to result from litigation, and therefore is unlikely to harm social welfare.
When the reverse injunctive settlement occurs primarily because the plaintiff's
gain is greater than the defendant's loss (Ld < G,), then there is reason to worry that
injunctive settlements are especially harmful to social welfare. The reason is, as
Fig. 1 shows, the gain to the plaintiff will be positively correlated with the social
welfare loss. Indeed, consider the case of an injunctive settlement where the
plaintiff's gain is both substantial and only slightly greater than the defendant's loss.
The loss in social welfare is at its greatest, because the injunction excludes from the
market a foreign seller with a big cost advantage over the domestic firms. 15
We have confined ourselves to antidumping cases as a special type of
competition-blocking litigation, where the injunction has an inefficient result. The
question we have considered so far is if the injunctive settlement is a signal, in this
set of instances, of particularly worrisome cases. The answer is yes.
Should the injunctive settlement be banned? The injunctive settlement should be
banned if

(1-P)(W+Ld)>C±+Cd.

(1)

If this holds, the payoff to society from cases in which courts deny injunctions
(i.e., the social gain from competitive entry) exceeds the costs generated by
litigating those cases. Given this, injunctive settlements reduce social welfare. Since
all of the injunctive settlements will be reverse payment settlements, we will
consider whether reverse injunctive settlements should be banned.
Proposition 4 A reverse antidumping settlement should be prohibited if the
expected gain to consumers from entry exceeds the plaintiff's cost of litigation

((1 - P)W > Cp).
The argument for this runs as follows. From (1), we know that the reverse
settlement is welfare reducing if (1 - P)W + (1 - P)Ld > C + Cd. If

4

On collusion and injunctive settlements of antidumping disputes, see Prusa (1992).
Prusa (1992) provides empirical evidence that settled antidumping disputes are associated with
reductions in trade that are at least as large as those resulting from adjudicated disputes.
1
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(1 - P)Ld > PD + Cd, then a reverse settlement is feasible (see Part II), and it
will be welfare reducing whenever (1 - P)W > C. The final step of the argument is to show that a reverse settlement is unlikely to be observed when
(1 - P)Ld < PD + Cd (i.e., defendant does not need to receive money to settle).
This is implied by the Landes-Posner-Gould model and the fact that the plaintiff
moves first by filing. Given that he moves first, the plaintiff will always make a
positive demand that is within the settlement zone if (1 - P)Ld < PD + Cd, and the
parties will settle. Otherwise (i.e., reversing the inequality), the plaintiff will offer
the smallest reverse payment necessary to settle.
The condition (1 - P)W > Cp is likely to hold because Cp will be relatively
small. The reason is that the plaintiff spends relatively little because a government
agency prosecutes the complaint; the agency's costs are largely fixed and the burden
of producing evidence is largely on the defendant/foreign entrant. It follows, then,
that social welfare could be improved by banning the reverse injunctive settlement
in the antidumping context.
Since antidumping injunctions lead to inefficient results, the suggestion that the
reverse injunctive settlement be banned should not be seen as a surprise. Still, in the
presence of substantial litigation costs, it is not clear that every reverse injunctive
settlement will be socially undesirable. Proposition 2 shows that the case for
banning reverse injunctive settlements remains strong in the antidumping context,
even with substantial litigation costs taken into account.
There are other settings that share the general structure of the antidumping
problem. A hush money settlement saves society litigation expenses, but may also
impose welfare costs (Daughety and Reinganum 1999). Or consider the procurement setting, with two contractors. The incumbent contractor can seek to have the
efficient entrant contractor deemed ineligible, a costly process like litigation
(Marshall et al. 1994). The incumbent may prefer to pay off the efficient entrant,
which is the same as a reverse settlement.
4.3 Patent antitrust and more general applications
Unlike antidumping prosecutions, patent infringement cases cannot be treated as
consistent-belief disputes with a high probability of plaintiff victory. Many of the
disputes involve low-probability claims on the part of the plaintiff patent holder and
disparate beliefs as to the plaintiff's likelihood of success. On the other hand, in
many of the patent infringement cases the plaintiff's gain from the injunction
exceeds the defendant's loss. Given this, and the foregoing analysis, the reverse
settlement should be taken as a sign of potentially harmful welfare consequences in
the patent-antitrust context. 16
However, the patent infringement setting is more complicated than the
antidumping setting. The patent infringement cases involve dynamic innovation
incentives and static demand-inducement incentives that are likely to be affected by
the willingness of courts to grant competition-blocking injunctions.

16 There is a large literature identifying the potential welfare costs of reverse settlements in the patent
context. See, e.g., Shapiro (2003), Hovenkamp et al. (2003), Cotter (2004).
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Fig. 2 Diagram of static efficiency gain due to demand inducement

Consider the static demand-inducement factor. Suppose the plaintiff firm-e.g., a
drug company-invests in creating demand for its new product-a drug. If the
injunction is awarded in its favor, it will have an incentive to continue to invest in
promotion. Thus, unlike the antidumping scenario, excluding the low-cost rival
causes supports product promotion, which causes the demand curve to shift
outward, as in Fig. 2.
Because the injunction itself could be socially desirable, the injunctive settlement
could be socially desirable. However, we do not know in advance whether a
particular injunction is socially desirable-that is, we do not know in advance
whether the dispute is best characterized by Fig. 1 or by Fig. 2.
4.3.1 Modifying the basic model
The settlement model can be modified to take into account the special considerations in patent infringement litigation. The new features to take into account are the
static and dynamic efficiency effects. As in Fig. 2, let AG, represent the captured
portion of the static efficiency gain.
The dynamic incentive is difficult to model from the ground up, but we will
simplify matters by assuming that there is a potential dynamic incentive cost
resulting from the rejection of the plaintiff's infringement claim. Let the social cost
of the dynamic incentive effect be 'P. The social cost is likely to be a function of the
ex ante probability of infringement. 17 For example, if the ex ante probability of
infringement is close to zero because the patent is invalid, then the social cost of a
rejection of the plaintiff's infringement claim is probably close to zero. As a general
The term ex ante probability of infringement was introduced in Crane (2002). Crane suggests that the
social cost of rejecting an infringement claim is positively correlated with the ex ant probability of
infringement (Crane 2002, at 780).
1
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rule, then, the social cost of the dynamic incentive effect is an increasing function of
the ex ante probability of infringement.1 8 The portion of the social cost borne by the
plaintiff will be represented by 7T.
Using Proposition 1, any injunctive settlement will be a reverse payment
settlement. The reverse payment (injunctive) settlement is desirable to the
infringement plaintiff if

(2)

S + Gp+ AGp > Pp(Gp+AGp+ D) - Cp, - (1 - Pp)jy

where S < 0, and the last term reflects the plaintiff's perception of the dynamic
incentive cost of losing his patent monopoly. The condition determining whether the
settlement is desirable to the defendant is the same as in the basic model examined
in the part III.
An injunctive settlement will be desirable, as between the litigating firms, when

(1 -

Pd)Ld -

(

- Pp)(Gp+AG) + (Pp- Pd)D -

(1 - Pp)P

<Cp + Cd

(3)

To simplify, consider the consistent beliefs case, where the injunctive settlement
condition becomes
(1-

P)(Ld - Gp-AGp -7T)<C

+ Cd,(4

or

Ld<Gp+AGp+(Cp+C)/(1-P)+7T.

(5)

Incorporating efficiencies does not greatly change the analysis from the basic
model examined earlier in this paper. Note that if Gp > Ld then a reverse settlement
will occur in any setting in which entry is desirable to defendant and the plaintiff has
an incentive to file an infringement action (Proposition 3). The scope for injunctive
settlements expands because the gain to the plaintiff is now greater than in the
previous analysis (because of the static efficiency effect), and because the cost of
failing to settle is greater too (because of the dynamic efficiency effect).
P represents the objective probability that the plaintiff will prevail, or the ex ante
probability of infringement. We can also treat P as an index of the patent's
validity.1 9 Using Fig. 2, injunctive settlements should be banned if

(1-P)[W+Ld- (AGp+Z)] >Cp+Cd+(1-P)T

(6)

The first two terms on the left hand side of (6) equal the expected welfare gain
from competitive entry. The next two terms, (AGp + Z), equal the static efficiency

18 More precisely, the social cost will be a function of the probability that the patent is valid and that it
was infringed, and it should be an increasing function in both variables. However, the marginal
contribution of each variable to the social cost will not be the same. The social cost is also a function of
the wealth generated by the patent incentive. The wealth generated by a patent is the sum of the consumer
surplus and monopoly profits generated by the patent. Specifically, the term y T will be determined in part
by the expected stream of patent profits forgone because of the discouragement effect. The remainder
term (1 - y) P will be determined in part by the expected residual consumer welfare forgone because of
the discouragement effect. These terms are capable of estimation.
19 P is the product of the probability of validity and the probability of infringement (assuming the two are
independent). Treating it as an index of patent validity is clearly imprecise because it implicitly assumes
that the probability of infringement is one.
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gain from the injunction. The last term on the right hand side is the expected dynamic
efficiency loss. It should be clear that (1 - P)[W + Ld - (AGp + Z) - 'T] is the
social return from litigation.20 The injunctive settlement should be banned if the
social return from litigation exceeds the cost of litigation.
Thus, in patent infringement litigation, banning the injunctive settlement is
socially desirable only if the expected welfare gain from competitive entry exceeds
the static efficiency gainsfrom the injunction, the cost of litigation, and the dynamic
incentive cost.

As suggested in Shapiro (2003), the strength of the underlying patent
infringement claim P plays an important role in determining the social desirability
of an injunctive settlement. However, the scope of the patent and the market, the
size of the efficiency gain from entry, static and dynamic efficiency costs, 2 ' and
litigation costs also play a role. These factors suggest that a rule of reason analysis
of competition blocking settlements in the patent setting could be quite complicated.
4.3.2 Incentive alignment and optimal penalty

Given the ambiguous welfare effects of the injunctive settlement in the patent
context, one solution to the settlement problem is to alter the incentives of the
plaintiff so that he seeks an injunctive settlement only under conditions in which it
is socially desirable.
4.3.2.1 Incentive alignment under consistent beliefs

Consider an example in

which the parties have consistent beliefs. The private settlement condition (3) can be
used with the social incentive condition (6) to determine a penalty (or subsidy) that
would align the incentives of the individual firms with the social incentive on
settlement. If the plaintiff is required to pay,
Gp + W- Z-(1 -y)'P

(7)

upon gaining his injunction, then the social incentive to settle will be the same as the
private incentive to settle,22 which means that the parties will seek a settlement only

20 If there is a strong correlation between T and P, the social return from litigation should be expressed
as (1-P)[W + Ld - (AGp + Z) - T(P)], which reflects the assumption of Crane (2002). If T increases
strongly in P, then the social return to litigation would not only approach zero as P increases, but is also
more likely to be negative for high P values. Focusing on P might serve as a short cut to trying to
determining the social return from patent litigation. In general, the relationship between T and P is an
empirical question.
21 The dynamic incentive effect is emphasized in Langenfeld and Li (2004) and in Blair and Cotter

(2002).
22 If the penalty is set equal to (7) the plaintiff's net reward will be Gp -

(Gp + W - Z - (1 - y)W) =
-W + Z + (1 - y)W. This implies that the private settlement condition will be equivalent to the social
settlement condition. Specifically, the privatejoint payoff from litigation is (1 - P)(Ld - Gp - AGp - yW).
The social payoff from litigation is (1 - P)[W + Ld - (AGp + Z) - W]. When the penalty is set according
to (7), these payoffs are the same.
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when it is socially desirable. The optimal penalty requires the plaintiff to regurgitate
the monopoly rent and to pay for the deadweight loss; however, it also subsidizes
the plaintiff an amount equal to the "uncaptured" static and dynamic efficiency
gains. The optimal penalty should be applied to the monopolist whether it gains its
injunction through a court order or through settlement.
The optimal penalty in (7) is a generalized version of the monopolization penalty
of Landes (1983). If the static and dynamic efficiency effects are zero, as in the
antidumping scenario, the optimal penalty is equal to the monopoly transfer plus the
deadweight loss (Gp + W). Similarly, if the static efficiency gain is captured
completely by the monopolist and the dynamic cost is borne in its entirety by the
monopolist, the optimal penalty is again equal to the monopoly transfer plus the
deadweight loss.
4.3.2.2 Incentive alignment and inconsistent beliefs We have so far considered
incentive alignment in the case of consistent beliefs. The optimal penalty would
require the monopolist to pay for the welfare transfer from consumers as well as the
deadweight loss, and subsidize the monopolist to the extent of uncaptured static and
dynamic efficiency gains. We explore in this section whether this approach remains
valid in cases in which the litigants have inconsistent beliefs regarding the ex ante
probability of infringement.
First, consider the setting in which litigating parties' beliefs are consistent with
the Priest and Klein (1984) hypothesis. Trial-outcome predictions diverge but only
because of random differences in beliefs. Under the Priest-Klein model, trialoutcome beliefs are generated according Pd = P + Ed, P = P + ep, where Ed and
Ep have mean zero, and where P is the objective estimate of the likelihood of a
verdict for the plaintiff (the probability of a finding of patent infringement) (Hylton
2006). If the optimal penalty is imposed on the patent holder then settlement will be
acceptable to the parties when

(1 - P)(W - (AG + Z) + Ld -T) - ep(W - (AG+ Z) -T) - dLd
+ (ep - ed)D<Cp + Cd

(8)

and since ep and Ed have mean zero, the private and social incentives to settle will be
the same in expectation. Thus, in the Priest-Klein scenario, the optimal incentive
alignment penalty accomplishes its objective.23
Now consider the inconsistent beliefs scenario where Pd = P, Pp = P + Q, and
1 - P > Q > 0. The defendant's prediction is equal to the objective probability of
infringement, while the plaintiff overestimates the likelihood the patent will be
upheld. The joint private return from litigation is equal in expectation to

(1 -P)(Ld-G-AG

G-7T)+Q(Gp+AG+7T)+QD

(9)

2

The Priest-Klein generates a plaintiff win rate prediction of 50%. This is consistent with the evidence
on patent litigation. Plaintiff win rates in patent infringement litigation are roughly 50%, see Allison and
Lemley (1998). Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that patent infringement trials can be described by
the Priest-Klein model. However, this does not imply that half of patents are invalid. The evidence on win
rates shows that only the most uncertain patents are litigated all the way to judgment, and that within the
sample of litigated patents plaintiffs are no better than defendants at determining the validity of the patent.
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where the first term reflects the potential net gain if the injunction is overturned.
The last two terms reflect the differences in the parties' expectations of the
trial outcome. Recall that the social return from litigation is equal to (1 - P)
(W + Ld - (AGe + Z) - T).
The optimal penalty equates the private and social returns from litigation. Unlike
the Priest-Klein scenario, the optimal penalty is no longer the generalized
monopolization penalty (Landes 1983) in (7). In this case, the optimal penalty is

Gp+(W-Z- (1 -7)P)+ (1 -d)[Q(AGp+TP+D)]

(10)

where 6 = (1 - P)/(1 - P - Q) > 1. The intuitive explanation for (10) is easier
seen under the assumption that there are no static or dynamic efficiency concerns, in
which case the optimal penalty would be

Gp + bW + (1 - b)QD.

(11)

Since the litigation decision is influenced by the divergent trial-outcome
expectations of the parties, the optimal penalty reduces the relative importance of
this effect by increasing the weight on W. In addition, since divergent expectations
already push the parties into litigation, there is a lesser need in this case to use a
large penalty (because some monopolies will be overturned by the court). This is the
reason for the last term in (11), which is negative.
The lesson suggested here is that when divergent beliefs (or asymmetric
information) drive the parties into litigation (because plaintiffs believe that the
likelihood of a finding of infringement is greater than defendants think it is),
the optimal penalty is less than it would be under consistent beliefs (7) because the
worst-case monopolization scenario will be overturned more often in the courts.
Conversely, when divergent beliefs cause the parties to litigate less frequently than
they would under consistent beliefs (because defendants believe the likelihood of a
finding of infringement is less than plaintiffs think it is), the optimal penalty will be
greater than it would be under consistent beliefs.
4.3.3 Waivers
A policy of banning reverse or injunctive settlements would lead parties to opt for
pre-dispute settlements, or waivers. Since the private and social returns from
litigation are not the same, predispute waivers will be exchanged under conditions
in which they may not be socially desirable.
Some patents are infringed intentionally. In other cases, the rival firm infringes
the patent because it has not taken care (e.g., engaged in a search of patent records)
to avoid the infringement. It follows that the infringement problem can be treated
like that of accidental injuries.
Suppose the rival firm has a choice of taking care (search) or not taking care
(no search). Let x be the cost of taking care to avoid infringement. Let 4, be the
probability that infringement occurs when the rival firm has taken care, and let
A c be the probability that infringement occurs when the rival firm has not taken
care.
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We will make a few simplifying assumptions for the analysis of waiver
agreements. First, we will assume consistent beliefs regarding the patent's validity
(Pp = Pd = P). Second, in the analysis below we will assume that the patent holder
loses his monopoly only through some conduct by the rival that could form the basis
of an infringement claim-even if it is not technically infringement. This rules out
instances in which the rival firm takes some action that causes the incumbent to lose
its monopoly, but the incumbent has no credible basis at all for an infringement
claim. Third, we will simplify matters by assuming that the patent holder does not
introduce any ex post static efficiencies (e.g., demand inducement). Fourth, we will
assume that maintenance of the patent monopoly is socially desirable, which means
that ' - W - Ld> 0.
A patent holder could enter into a predispute waiver, in which the monopolist
agrees not to sue the rival for infringement. First, let's consider a standard waiver.
In a standard waiver, the potential plaintiff (patent holder) accepts a payment in
exchange for an agreement not to sue the rival firm when it infringes the patent. The
minimum price demanded by the patent holder for the waiver is
2

,,(G+ y ) - [F,(I - P)(G+ T) + .tCp].

(12)

This is the difference between the patent holder's expected loss in the absence of
the right to sue for infringement and his expected loss given the right to sue for
infringement. t The maximum offer from the rival (or potential defendant) would be
x

(13)

+ Csd + CPLd,

which reflects the expected costs of search, litigation, and infringement liability.2 5
It follows that a standard waiver will be exchanged when

(an, - a,(1

- P))(G+ T) -

)ePLd - x<,(Cp + Cd).

(14)

In other words, when the joint benefits of deterrence, as between the two parties,
are less than the total cost of litigation, a standard waiver will be exchanged.
Now let us consider an injunctive waiver. In the injunctive waiver, the potential
plaintiff (patent holder) accepts (or gives) a payment in exchange for an agreement
not to sue the rival and for the rival to forgo the infringing activity.
The injunctive waiver is acceptable to the potential plaintiff if

S+an,(Gp+yT) > a,,(G+ y)

-

[(a,(1

-

P)(G+ 7T)+ .tCp]

(15)

The second term on the left hand side reflects the assumption that the monopolist
will lose nothing in the event that an infringing act takes place, because the waiving
defendant will immediately forgo the infringing conduct. As a result, the injunctive
waiver is far more valuable to the patent holder than is the standard waiver.

24 For the formal analysis of waiver incentives in the context of ordinary litigation, see Hylton (2000).

To simplify we are ignoring the possible damage claim component, which would be purely speculative
at the stage of a waiver negotiation. Moreover, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneer drug developers
can file infringement suits after being notified that a generic intends to enter the market (see, e.g., Blair
and Cotter 2002, at 505-506). This model applies especially to litigation under the Hatch-Waxman
provisions, which is the most common source of reverse patent settlements today.
25
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The injunctive waiver is acceptable to the potential defendant if
S + auncLd <x +

(16)

cCd + )uPLd.

An injunctive waiver will be mutually agreeable when:

(an, - acP)Ld - [a,(1 - P)(G+ y)] - x<

,(Cp

+ Cd)

(17)

Finally, consider the social interest in waivers. In a setting in which no one
litigates, so patents are infringed at will, the social cost would be
ac(T - W - Ld)

(18)

With infringement litigation available, the total social cost is
x+

al(1-

P)(T -W

- L)

-hl(C+ C)

(19)

It follows that patent litigation is not socially desirable if

[an - a

- P)]( -W

-L) -x<a(Cp+Cd),

(20)

which means that the social benefit from deterring infringement less the cost of
avoiding infringement is less than the patent litigation costs. Even if all patents are
socially desirable, patent litigation may not be socially desirable.
More importantly, comparing the social waiver incentive condition (20) to the
private waiver incentive conditions [(17) and (14)], it is clear that the private and
social incentives for waiving infringement litigation are not the same. Because of
the externalities present in the patent context, the private waiver incentive
conditions diverge from the social waiver conditions. This is not true in the normal
(e.g., tort) litigation context, where the private waiver condition and the social
waiver condition are the same (Hylton 2000).
In the standard litigation context, predispute waivers provide a Coasean solution
to the problem of inefficient litigation. 26 In the patent infringement setting, private
waiver agreements do not provide a solution to the problem of inefficient
infringement litigation.
There is more to be said about the private and social incentive conditions for
waivers. First, compare the standard private waiver condition (15) to the social
waiver condition (20). They imply the following:
Proposition 5 If the probability of infringement is the same whether or not the
rival takes care ( ,, = )J, then the optimal penalty Gp + W - (1 - y)T
guarantees that standard waivers will be exchanged when and only when patent
infringement litigation is socially undesirable.

To see this note that if 1_
waivers, becomes

-

Le, then (14), the condition for privately optimal

)uP(Gp+yP- Ld) -x<l(Cp + Cd)

(21)

and (20), the condition for socially optimal waivers, becomes

2 On the inefficiency of litigation, see Shavell (1982b). On waivers as a Coasean solution, see Hylton
(2000).
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(22)

a^T - W - Ld) - x<X,(Cp + Cd)

Thus, if 4 = ly, and if the monopolist pays a penalty equal to Gp + W - (1 - y)P,
private waivers allowing infringement to occur will be exchanged when and only when
patent litigation is socially undesirable. If the probability of infringement is not
independent of the care taken by the rival, then the optimal penalty is more complicated.2 7
Now compare the injunctive waiver condition (17) to the social waiver condition
(20). If Xn - lu, then (17) becomes

X,(1 - P)(Ld

-

Gp - 7T) - x<XC(Cp+ Cd)

(23)

and it is socially desirable to enforce patents when

X

-P(
W-Ld) >x+C(Cp+Cd)

(24)

If the monopolist is required to pay the penalty Gp + W - (1 - y)P, then the private
incentive for the exchange of injunctive waivers (preventing infringement) becomes

X,(l-P)(

-W

-Ld)>x+

(Cp+C).

(25)

Proposition 6 If the probability of infringement is the same whether or not the
rival takes care (t,, = 2 ), and if the ex ante probability of infringement is greater
than 50% (P ;> %), then the optimalpenalty Gp + W - (1 - 7)? guarantees that
injunctive waivers will be exchanged only when patent infringement litigation is

socially undesirable.2 8
These results show that the internalization approach to the optimal penalty (8) is
a possible solution to the incentive alignment problem in the waiver setting, but only
under special conditions. Specifically, the optimal penalty aligns private and social
incentives to settle, and to waive, if the probability of infringement is the same
whether or not the firm conducts a search.
Although the incentive alignment approach is possible in the waiver context, it
requires much more information than in the settlement context. The informational
requirements are so steep, in the waiver context, that the optimal penalty approach
may not be a practical solution.
4.3.4 Risk aversion, clouds over patents, and other costs

There are other costs that could be incorporated into the model of this paper. Some
commentators have noted that risk aversion is a factor that drives some patent
holders to seek injunctive settlements. 29 In any event, the cost of risk could be
incorporated into this analysis as another cost that, like litigation costs, the parties
can avoid by entering into a settlement.
27 The optimal penalty in the general standard waiver case is G, + W -

(1 - y)W + [(Ae - A,)/
(A., - A(1 - P))]Ld. The last term is an additional charge to the monopolist because his contract has
increased the rate of infringement and at the same time denied society the gain from that increased rate of
infringement.
28 The optimal penalty in the general injunctive waiver case is G, + HW - (H - y)T - [(1 - 2P)/
(1 - P))]Ld, where H = ([(A-e (1 - P)]IA1 - P)).
29 See Crane (2002).
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Some commentators have pointed to the uncertainty surrounding the patent as a
motivating factor behind injunctive settlements. A patent, as commentators have
noted, is not a right to exclude, but a right to try to exclude. It is a probabilistic property
right.30 However, the holder of a patent clearly has an incentive to increase its value by
reducing the likelihood that it will be found insufficient as a bar to some rival.
Transaction cost reduction provides another motivation to seek an injunctive
settlement. Patents are traded. If the uncertainty concerning validity can be reduced,
it will be easier to trade in patents. Uncertainty is a transaction cost that obstructs
efficient trades in the market for patents.

5 Practical implications
As a preliminary matter, the reverse payment settlements that have become
controversial in competition-blocking litigation, particularly in the patent antitrust
and antidumping settings, reflect features that are observed generally in injunctive
litigation. The parties in injunctive litigation have the option of choosing a standard
settlement that preserves the status quo or an injunctive settlement that implements
the terms sought by the plaintiff. Both types of settlement are potentially wealth
enhancing to the litigating parties, and to society as well, because they avoid
expenditures on litigation. Injunctive settlements are likely where the gain to the
plaintiff from the injunction exceeds the loss to the defendant. Reverse payment
settlements are likely to be observed whenever the stakes from the injunction are
large relative to the damages and the costs of litigation.
These general observations may take on a special importance in the context of
competition-blocking litigation. The gain to the plaintiff from the injunction, in the
competition blocking context, will be correlated with the consumer welfare loss
from blocking competition. Injunctive lawsuits will tend to be filed in areas where
the potential consumer harm is greatest. Injunctive settlements will be among those
lawsuits with the greatest potential harm to consumers, and (virtually) all of them
will be reverse settlements (Proposition 1). For these reasons, the suspicions
concerning reverse settlements in the competition-blocking context are warranted.
Those suspicions, however, have to be balanced against the social welfare gains
that are generated by reverse payment (injunctive) settlements. They reduce
litigation costs. Moreover, if the reason for blocking competition is to support
dynamic (innovation) or static efficiency incentives (market development), then
the settlements may improve welfare in some cases. The mere fact that a large
reverse settlement payment has occurred is not a sufficient basis for inferring that
the settlement reduces social welfare.31 These straightforward observations have
been disregarded in some of the critical discussions of reverse settlements.
30

Shapiro (2003)

3 If the stakes are sufficiently large, reverse payments will occur even though the likelihood of a finding
of infringement is high. Moreover, if the dynamic efficiency cost is substantial, the reverse settlement
may enhance social welfare. These are basic implications of the model in Part IV of this paper. It is in
contrast to one of the most widely-accepted views in the patent-antitrust literature that a large reverse
payment should be taken as a clear sign that the patent is invalid, see, e.g., Hovenkamp (2004, at 28)
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The core source of controversy surrounding injunctive settlements is that the
social incentive to settle differs from the private incentive. This is also a feature
observed generally in litigation. In the general litigation context, commentators
have noted that parties may settle when it would be better from society's perspective
if they litigated in order to enhance the stock of legal capital (Fiss 1984; Hylton
2000). The mere existence of litigation costs does not imply a divergence between
private and social settlement incentives. Litigation costs (in most models) are borne
entirely by the parties. Given this, any settlement achieved to avoid litigation costs
is also consistent with social welfare. But once we consider broader societal effects
from litigation-such as effects on the stock of legal capital or the congestion of
courts-then we must recognize that the private and social settlement incentives
diverge.
The divergence between private and social incentives is especially noticeable in
the competition-blocking scenario. The reason is that there is a third party, the
consumer, who is directly affected by the parties' settlement agreement.
5.1 Variations on settlement
The model in this paper assumes that the settlement agreement follows a legitimate
competition-blocking lawsuit-such as an antidumping prosecution or a patent
infringement claim. However, this need not be the case, and this raises some
important issues that are not directly addressed by this model. One can expand the
model to take these additional issues into account.
There are several types of competition-blocking settlements, some of which seem
to fall outside of the model examined here. One type is a competition-blocking
settlement that is reached in connection with a lawsuit that has no connection to
competition. For example, the plaintiff could sue the defendant for defamation, and
condition settlement on the defendant's agreement to stay out of his market.
Suppose, for example, that the lawsuit is nothing more than a ruse to allow the
parties to enter into a competition-blocking agreement under the cloak of settlement.
If the lawsuit itself is ginned up for the sole purpose of cloaking an anticompetitive
agreement, then both the social welfare loss from prohibiting competitive entry
(W + Ld) and the litigation costs are elements of waste. Unless there is some
efficiency that is generated by the settlement, it should be considered per se illegal.
A second variation based on the settlement just mentioned is one attached to a
legitimate lawsuit. Suppose the plaintiff brings a legitimate defamation lawsuit
against the defendant and conditions settlement on the defendant agreeing to stay
out of his market. The settlement saves society the litigation costs in this case. Still,
the lawsuit itself could not have led to the same result. If there is no efficiency
generated by the settlement, its social desirability will be determined by a
comparison of the welfare loss and the avoided litigation costs.

Footnote 31 continued
("a firm willing to pay roughly $75 million per year to keep an alleged infringer out of the market when a
successful preliminary injunction would have done the same thing for the cost of obtaining the injunction
indicates that the prospects for a preliminary injunction were very poor.").
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A third variation involves a real competition-blocking lawsuit, such as
antidumping or patent infringement, that generates a settlement, as in this model;
but the settlement is more restrictive of competition than the lawsuit itself. For
example, the settlement may require the defendant to stay out of several markets.
This variation is in fundamental respects the same as the second variation.
Assuming no efficiency gain generated by the settlement, its social desirability will
be determined by a comparison of the total welfare loss (including the loss due to
the additional restrictions) and the avoided litigation costs.
There is a strong case for treating the second and third variations as per se
antitrust violations. The settlement could be efficient in both cases. But the
anticompetitive potential is clearly greater than in the case examined in the model of
this paper. And since the anticompetitive potential is virtually limitless in the second
and third variations, a per se rule may be appropriate.
These variations suggest the need for legal doctrines that distinguish settlements
in (a) legitimate competition blocking lawsuits that are (b) within the boundaries of
the lawsuit's anticompetitive effect. Settlements that do not satisfy these two
conditions raise serious suspicions under the antitrust laws.
5.2 Proposals for regulating settlements
There are several types of proposals that have been suggested for regulating reverse
payment injunctive settlements. Perhaps the simplest is to declare all such
settlements per se unlawful under the antitrust laws. Hovenkamp et al. (2003)
proposed that reverse settlements that exceed the cost of litigation should be deemed

per se illegal. The FTC, in the Schering-Plough litigation,3 2 adopted this position,
though it was rejected by the appellate court.
The analysis in this paper provides little support for such a per se prohibition.
First, the reverse settlement is a signal that the gain to the defendant from
competitive entry (equivalently, the defendant's loss from the injunction) is large
relative to the damages and costs of litigation. That is consistent with the claim that
the settlement poses a risk to consumers. However, the reason the plaintiff is willing
to pay for the reverse settlement is that the plaintiff's gain from the injunction is also
large relative to the damages and litigation costs. The plaintiff's gain could be large
because of the static (market development) or dynamic (innovation) gains from the
injunction. The mere fact that a large reverse payment is observed does not imply
that the settlement reduces either overall social welfare of consumer welfare.
Suppose the reverse settlement is less than the total cost of litigation, which
would be permitted under the Hovenkamp et al. proposal. It should be clear that the
plaintiff and defendant can alter the terms of settlement to bring about this result,
whatever the social welfare effects of their settlement. For example, the parties
could agree to share all or parts of their markets rather than let the settlement
payment be the only variable term of the agreement.

3 In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, at 12 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.fte.gov/os/adjpro/
d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Another per se rule was proposed in Crane (2002), which is to prohibit, on a per
se basis, reverse payment injunctive settlements when the ex ante likelihood of a
finding of infringement (P) is low and to adopt a per se legality rule when the
likelihood of a finding of infringement is high. This would require a preliminary
determination of the likelihood of patent infringement as part of the antitrust trial.33
This paper's model indicates that there are other factors in addition to the ex ante
likelihood of a finding of infringement that should be part of the analysis. Certainly
if the ex ante likelihood of a finding of infringement is close to one the settlement
should be permitted. This rule would be advisable even when there were no possible
efficiency bases for enjoining competitive entry. If the ex ante likelihood of a
finding of infringement is almost one, prohibiting the injunctive settlement would be
socially harmful because it would force wasteful litigation expenses.
However, even if the ex ante likelihood of plaintiff success in the infringement
suit is not high, a reverse settlement may be defensible on welfare grounds. The
reason is that in addition to the static welfare losses created by the settlement, a
social planner would have to take into account the potential efficiency gains from
the injunction. For example, suppose the likelihood of a finding of infringement is
only 50%. Suppose the static welfare loss (from monopoly pricing) is $100, the gain
from competitive entry is $100, and the total cost of litigation is only $20. If there
are no potential efficiency gains, the social gain from continued litigation would be
$100, and the cost of that litigation would be only $20. It would make sense, then, to
ban the reverse injunctive settlement. However, suppose the efficiency gain from
market development is $180. In that case, the expected social gain from continued
litigation would be $10, which is less than the total cost of litigation. Even if the ex
ante likelihood of an infringement finding were only 40%, it would still be desirable
to permit the reverse injunctive settlement. This example shows that the potential
efficiency gains do not have to overwhelm the potential static welfare losses for the
reverse injunctive settlement to be socially desirable-and that is because of the
existence of litigation costs. The greater the litigation costs, the less demanding
society should be on the size of the potential efficiency gains and the ex ante
34
likelihood of success in an infringement action.
Shapiro (2003) proposes a standard that would require settlements to give
consumers the same level of welfare in expectation that they would receive had
litigation occurred. Although it is not clear how such a standard would be
implemented, it probably would require a comparison of the expected static welfare
losses with expected efficiency gains. Presumably the settlement would be permitted
under this standard only when expected efficiency gains exceeded expected welfare
losses. This approach ignores the risk of judicial error and litigation costs as factors

3 For arguments against such an approach, see Brodley and O'Rourke (2002). One obvious problem
with Crane's proposal is that a "preliminary determination" of the patent infringement question could be
such a costly and time consuming proceeding that it fails every test of its efficiency.
34 One factor that weighs in favor of Crane's approach is the fact that the social cost of rejecting an
infringement claim is likely to be positive correlated with the ex ante probability of infringement. In light
of this Crane's approach may be preferable because it comes close to the right answer in most cases
without requiring an enormously difficult rule-of-reason analysis.
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that might justify a settlement on social welfare grounds. The basis for ignoring
these factors is unclear. The risk of error and litigation expenses are real costs.
A rule-of-reason approach3 5 to the review of a reverse settlement should take into
account the ex ante likelihood of a finding of infringement, the likely welfare losses
(a function of the scope of the patent), efficiency costs, and litigation costs. Such a
standard would be difficult to implement, and might lead to a recommendation to
forbear from prohibiting reverse patent settlements unless there is clear evidence
that market development and innovation incentives are not implicated by the
dispute, which is likely to be rare. Judge Posner, in Asahi Glass v. Pentech
36
suggests that injunctive settlements should be upheld unless
Pharmaceuticals,
there are "suspicious circumstances" indicating anticompetitive effect.37 Suspicious
circumstances might indicate that the patent settlement agreement is merely a
device to facilitate collusion. 38 This approach could provide the basis for a rule of
reason test of settlements. It would stay the hands of courts in cases where
suspicious factors were not present. The danger is that courts may expand the set of
suspicious circumstances to include factors that are not reliable signals of
anticompetitive effect.
The strongest case for a per se prohibition of reverse settlements is offered by the
antidumping setting. In the antidumping setting we observe a domestic cartel
seeking to exclude a low-price foreign rival. The end result of a successful
prosecution will be a reduction in consumer welfare. The plaintiff cartel is not
involved in innovation or the creation of static efficiencies that might justify a
protected market. In this scenario there is a strong case for prohibiting reverse
settlements, or treating them as per se antitrust violations. Under the conditions in
which a reverse settlement is attractive, the settlement will very likely reduce social
welfare, because the litigation costs avoided will be much smaller than the expected
welfare losses. However, even this "strongest case" does not extend to all injunctive
settlements in the antidumping context. There may be cases in which the litigation
costs are large relative to the expected welfare losses, and as a result the injunctive
settlement could be socially beneficial.
Outside of the antidumping setting, the case for a per se prohibition of reverse
settlements-even a conditional one based on the merits of the infringement claim
or the size of litigation costs-becomes considerably weaker. In the patent antitrust
setting, the per se approach requires society to forgo static and dynamic efficiencies
that might be supported by the injunction.
Another approach to regulating settlements would remove antitrust immunity
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine for settlement agreements that are clearly
anticompetitive (Cho 2009). The traditional argument against applying antitrust law
See Blair and Cotter (2002), suggesting a rule of reason approach to reverse patent settlements; see
also Schildkraut (2004).
3

36 289 F.Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill 2003).

3 Id. at 992. Posner's opinion indicate that courts also try to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
settlements, as suggested in the discussion in part III.A of this paper.
38 Id.; see also Priest (1977). Brodley and O'Rourke (2002) prefer to use suspicious circumstances in a
per se framework that would enable courts to infer anticompetitive intent.
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to prohibit anticompetitive settlement agreements is that they are merely the
byproduct of litigation, and legitimate (not objectively baseless) litigation is
immune from antitrust prosecution. 39 An alternative approach for regulating
settlements would involve the courts either narrowing the antitrust immunity
granted to litigation, or treating anticompetitive settlements under a different set of
rules. Although the proper way to distinguish undesirable settlements from the rest
would be to weigh all of the factors mentioned earlier (ex ante likelihood of a
finding of infringement, potential static welfare losses, potential efficiency gains,
and litigation costs), an approximately correct result might be reached through an
intent test based on objective evidence. Under such a test, if the plaintiff pressured
the defendant to reach a settlement under conditions in which he knew or had reason
to know that the likelihood of infringement (P) is extremely low, the court would
consider the settlement a sham.
One difficulty with all of the new proposals for using antitrust law to regulate
settlements is that the regulatory effect can be evaded if the potential litigants enter
into waiver agreements. Indeed, a per se ban on reverse payment settlements would
simply cause firms to rush into waiver agreements.
This paper proposes a third approach to regulating injunctive settlements. That is
to impose an optimal penalty (or subsidy) on to the plaintiff seeking to block
competition. If the optimal penalty were imposed in the antidumping context, no
firms would seek to block competition. In the patent context, an optimal penalty
could be negative (i.e., a subsidy) so that firms may still attempt to block
competition even when paying the penalty. The penalty, which generalizes the
approach suggested in Landes (1983), would internalize the welfare losses (transfer
plus deadweight loss) as well as the uncaptured efficiency gains.
The optimal penalty approach would be administratively difficult, but perhaps no
more so than a rule of reason standard applied with accuracy. Indeed it might reduce
administrative costs by switching the penalty assessment to some administrative
process rather than using the courts to generate complicated legal doctrines to assess
the legality of injunctive settlements.
The optimal penalty approach has the additional feature that it will not necessarily
lose its regulatory impact if firms opt for waiver agreements. If the likelihood that
infringement takes place is not greatly dependent on the patent search efforts of rival
firms, the optimal penalty approach need not be changed in order to correct incentives
even in the predispute waiver setting. On the other hand, if the likelihood of
infringement does depend on the patent search efforts of rivals, then agencies could
apply a different set of penalties to predispute injunctive waiver agreements.

6 Conclusion
This paper presents an economic analysis of injunctive and reverse settlements, and
applies it to competition-blocking litigation in the patent-antitrust and antidumping
3 Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1993).
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settings. Because of the consumer welfare implications of settlements, some
commentators have suggested competition-blocking settlements should be banned.
The general issue is the divergence between private and social incentives to settle.
This paper identifies the factors that account for that divergence and offers a
framework for evaluating the welfare implications of competition-blocking
settlements.
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